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‘Inheritance Families of Choice’? Lawyers’ reflections on gay and 
lesbian wills 
 
DANIEL MONK* 
This article presents the findings of research about the will writing practices 
of gays and lesbians. It develops a conversation between sociological 
literature about ‘families of choice’, which is silent about inheritance, and 
socio-legal research about ‘inheritance families’, which is relatively silent 
about sexuality. It demonstrates how research with lawyers can contribute to 
thinking about inheritance and complement historical archives about personal 
life and sexuality. Focusing on funeral rites, partners, ex-lovers, friendships, 
children and godchildren and birth families, the findings reveal how gay men 
and lesbians have used wills to communicate kinship practices in ways that 
both converge with and differ from conventional testamentary practices. 
Examining the findings through the concepts of generationality, family 
display, connectedness and ordinariness and locating them within the recent 
history of social and legal changes, it complicates and troubles both anti-
normative and individualistic readings of the choices gay and lesbians make 
in constructing their ‘inheritance families’. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the first UK socio-legal study of inheritance, Finch et al made a compelling case 
for viewing wills as a site for exploring shifting understandings of family and kinship. 
One of their conclusions was that ‘a more radical testamentary freedom’ might seem 
‘a real possibility’ for those outside of ascriptive relationships (those not based on 
genealogical position and spousal relationships).
1
 Their research did not refer to 
sexual orientation. But the possibility of gays and lesbians disproportionately 
occupying this ‘outsider’ position – developing kinship practices contra to ‘the 
family’ - has been a key issue in scholarship about sexuality.2 Indeed gays and 
lesbians have been identified more widely as exemplars for claims about 
                                                          
*School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, England 
d.monk@bbk.ac.uk 
 
I am grateful to the Socio-Legal Studies Association for funding the research and to the interviewees 
for their time and interest. I also wish to thank Helen Reece and Antu Sorainen and the anonymous 
referees for their constructive comments. 
 
1
 J. Finch et al., Wills, Inheritance and Families (1996) 181. 
2
 J. Weeks et al., Same Sex Intimacies: Families of Choice and Other Life Experiments (2001); S. 
Roseneil and S. Budgeon, ‘Cultures of Intimacy and Care Beyond ‘the Family’: Personal Life and 
Social Change in the Early 21st Century’ (2004) 52(2) Current Sociology 135. 
 2 
‘individualised’ self-reflexive identities.3 A key text is the groundbreaking study by 
Weston that coined the subsequently much cited expression, ‘families of choice’.4 Yet 
despite the possibility of choice provided by testamentary freedom and despite the 
fact that ‘negotiating . . . the demands of death’5 is a critical site of kinship practice, 
none of this literature refers to wills or inheritance.  
Explanations for this silence warrant further thought. They might include the 
fact that the focus in recent years on relationship recognition strategically played 
down the pre-existing ability to protect partners by wills,
6
 and the fact that 
testamentary freedom and practices do not give rise to any obvious ‘equal rights’ 
claims in law. Moreover, the silence might also be explained by the fact that the 
subject matter of inheritance per se is perceived as incompatible with wider 
progressive agendas; the queer theorist Halberstam, for example, describes wills as a 
key tool of ‘middle class logic’ and consequently inimical with ‘queer time’.7 More 
broadly, the silence resonates with the popular thesis, albeit contested, that it is death 
and not sex that is the dominant taboo of modern society.
8
 
Socio-legal scholarship about inheritance is also limited.
9
 But in recent years 
the groundbreaking work by Finch et al has been invigorated by research associated 
with the Law Commission’s 2009 review of the intestacy rules.10 This review, 
premised on the recognition of social changes in ‘family structure’, looked primarily 
at the legal position of surviving spouses and cohabitees. The approach to gays and 
lesbians in the review, and most of the associated research, has been to assert and 
assume an uncomplicated equality of treatment between opposite and same sex 
couples.
11
 However the research by Douglas et al explicitly engaged with the 
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possibility of wider shifts in attitudes to understandings of kinship. Introducing the 
concept of an ‘inheritance family’, they concluded that in determining its composition 
people continue to draw on a narrow nuclear family model.
12
 
Against this background, this article presents the findings of a small-scale 
qualitative research project about the will writing practices of gays and lesbians. It 
endeavours to develop a conversation between the literature about ‘families of 
choice’, which is silent about inheritance, and the research about ‘inheritance 
families’, which is relatively silent about sexuality.13 
The premise for this research – that there may be a specificity of the gay and 
lesbian experience and practice of will writing - is not to suggest that these 
experiences are in any way either monolithic or unique; and the terminology ‘gays 
and lesbians’ is used here in part to highlight the particular significance of gender. But 
the premise is based on the combined impact of four factors. First, formal legal 
equality is relatively recent. The experiences of being ‘outside of the law’ suggests 
that the well-documented assumptions of opposite-sex couples, albeit often wrong, 
about legal protections provided by the intestacy rules are less likely to be shared by 
gays and lesbians. Secondly, only a minority of gays and lesbians have children - a 
key motive for writing wills
14
 - and distinct legal implications exist when they do. 
Thirdly, one consequence of HIV/AIDS was that at a particular moment gay men 
confronted mortality collectively, ‘familial’ conflicts came to the fore, and specific 
will-writing services were established. Fourthly, archival evidence demonstrates 
testamentary freedom has provided and continues to provide gays and lesbians with a 
legal space for ‘coming-out’, to actively constitute their significant relations, 
rendering non-heterosexual relations visible.
15
 
These factors lend themselves to a hypothesis for the finding of ‘difference’ 
that resonates with an ‘anti-normative’ tendency in the dominant strands of 
contemporary queer theory.
16
 But to complicate the overly binary nature of 
oppositional perspectives, inherent in the concept of ‘heteronormativity’, this research 
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intentionally puts aside this framework. Adopting instead a theorized reflexive 
empirical approach, it takes seriously Smart’s call to be attentive to the fact that 
‘everyday life is messy and complex’ and so the challenge is to ‘find ways to 
represent messiness without forcing a coherence and kind of logic on to lived 
experience’.17  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The research took the form of semi-structured interviews with ten lawyers. Research 
with legal professionals has proved to be insightful, particularly in family law.
18
 But 
apart from Hasson’s research,19 it has not been adopted in the context of inheritance. 
While comparison of findings is consequently far from straightforward, the 
advantages of this method were threefold.  
First, the questions that lawyers ask clients when drafting wills provide access 
not only to the contents of wills but also to the reflections and deliberations of the 
testators. Indeed, the instructions provided for a will in some ways bear a resemblance 
to the sociological method of asking someone to draw a picture of their ‘family’.  
Secondly, while based on only ten interviews, it provided ‘quick’ access to the 
will writing practices of a very large number of people. Each lawyer was asked how 
many wills on average they write a year, and this figure, multiplied by the number of 
years they had been writing wills, resulted in a total of 13,000 – a very rough 
estimate, but a substantial number.  
Thirdly, as many of the lawyers interviewed have been writing wills over a 
considerable period of time – from the late 1970s to the present - their insights 
provide access to considerations of shifting experiences of families and kinship; 
notably both before and after formal legal equality for gays and lesbians. In this way 
the findings provide a temporal dimension that speaks to ‘generationality’, a factor 
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often overlooked but which is increasingly recognised as critical for complicating 
narratives about gays and lesbians.
20
  
The interviewees were identified by contacting lawyers who advertise in gay 
and lesbian media,
21
 current members of the Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Association,
22
 
former members of the Terence Higgins Trust (THT) Legal Services Group,
23
 and by 
word of mouth suggestions. While this sampling was ad hoc, an attempt was made to 
ensure a variety of interviewees. The ten interviewees comprised 7 men and 3 women, 
were aged between 28 and 67, and they worked in a variety of practices, ranging from 
London West End to predominantly legal aid Manchester suburbs. All of the lawyers 
had experience of writing wills for both gays and lesbians. But for some they formed 
the majority of their clientele, while for others they were, as far as they knew, 
relatively rare. Significantly the gay clients outnumbered the lesbians. One possible 
explanation for this is the sampling process itself, most obviously the inclusion of 
lawyers who wrote wills for people with HIV/AIDS. But the anecdotal practice of 
home-made will writing through women’s informal networks and the fact that 
lesbians overall as women are likely to be poorer than gay men are other factors that 
might explain the bias. This is a limitation of the research, and where the findings 
relate specifically to gay men this is made clear. 
A more general limitation was the reliance on the interviewees as an 
intermediary between the researcher and their clients. In addition, the interviews often 
required the lawyers to cast their minds back many years and draw on their memories, 
a problematic sociological resource.
24
 Moreover, testators do not always disclose the 
full picture of their personal lives to their lawyers. And while wills are written in the 
first person, to a certain extent they represent a form of ‘ventriloquism’ and their 
ability to express the authentic voice of a testator is questionable.
25
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Finally, in asserting their ‘professionalism’, lawyers can sometimes be 
inclined to offer what they consider to be the ‘correct’ answer, especially when the 
researcher is also a lawyer.
26
  This was evident here when on a number of occasions 
they asserted that there was ‘no difference’ between their straight and gay and lesbian 
clients, that their wills were, for example, ‘as boring as anyone else’s’ (2). Yet these 
statements, often made at the beginning of the interview, were frequently later 
contradicted. That identifying ‘sameness’ was considered ‘the right answer’ - 
expressing a commitment to the principle of equality - was reinforced by the fact that 
these assertions were more evident when the lawyer made clear that he or she was 
heterosexual. Where, however, the interviewee was openly gay or lesbian, they often 
appeared to be more comfortable speaking of ‘difference’ and drew on what some 
might perceive as problematic stereotypes. The identity, status and position of the 
interviewer are always critical factors, but raise particular issues in the context of 
research about sexuality.
27
  
This is a small study. The limitations would render the data inappropriate for 
asserting any conclusions of a quantitative nature. But as a form of qualitative 
research the aim is to ‘generalise to theory rather than to populations’28 and to this end 
the data’s key value is the extent to which it contributes to interdisciplinary debates 
about family, kinship and sexuality and to the emerging literature about sexuality and 
inheritance. It aims to raise questions rather than provide answers.  
 
FUNERAL WISHES 
For lawyers the meat of a will, its primary function, is the transfer of real and personal 
property. Shaffer has argued that property is ‘the medium of expression for will 
makers’29 and socio-legal research reflects this by focusing almost exclusively on 
beneficiaries.
30
 One consequence of this is that funeral wishes are overlooked. And a 
striking finding here was their particular significance for gay male clients, and the 
extent to which, far from being marginal, they brought to the fore key themes that 
emerge throughout the findings. 
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There are practical reasons why relying on a will to express funeral wishes is 
problematic; as one of the lawyers noted, ‘by the time someone looks at the will 
they’ve been buried when they ought to have been cremated’ (5). The pragmatic 
necessity of communicating preferences in other ways was emphasised by most of the 
lawyers. But while respecting the wishes of clients, the lawyers sometimes expressed 
ambivalence about the emphasis placed on funeral wishes, for example: ‘I often felt it 
was a disproportionately important thing to some of these people’ (7), and, ‘funeral 
wishes . . . sometimes gay people might go slightly over the top’ (5).  
Two distinct issues are raised here: importance and form. In thinking about the 
former it is perhaps revealing that the lawyers who spoke at most length about this 
aspect of will writing were those with a substantial gay client base during the early 
days of AIDS when large numbers of gay men were dying. As one lawyer 
commenting on that period noted: 
 
Sometimes funeral wishes were the only reason for writing a will . . . that 
wasn’t unusual then . . . and it was always then to keep a family away (10). 
 
Another confirmed that for these clients: 
 
Funeral and disposal of the remains were hugely important . . . sometimes I 
would have 2 or 3 goes at drafting the clause where the client would keep 
changing this or that or adding some more directions (4). 
 
The distinctiveness of these experiences was reinforced, implicitly, by lawyers with 
very few gay clients. For they noted that: 
 
The only time that seems to come up is when elderly ladies come in and 
they’ve got their Co-op plan and they’re keen to ensure that their family know 
that they’ve paid on their plan (3). 
 
 Not many people are keen to put something in because a lot of the time they 
say ‘oh well so and so will sort it out’ or ‘they know what my wishes are’ (2). 
 
 8 
Another explicitly noted that in the early years of AIDS: 
 
Straight clients were generally not infected . . . but even if they were terminal, 
those with cancer, they weren’t quite as bothered about disposal of their 
remains . . . the gay clients who were infected and were close to the end were 
quite emotional  . . . some of them were sitting there with clenched fists while 
they were talking to me about the type of funeral they wanted . . . this was a 
big issue for them.  Straight clients [pause] no they weren’t so bothered about 
it (4). 
 
What the gay clients at these time would have very possibly experienced, and almost 
certainly would have been conscious of, is what Green and Grant describe as 
‘disenfranchised grief’.31 Watney’s description of the funeral of a gay man who died 
in 1986 evokes this poignantly: 
 
In the congregation of some forty people there were two other gay men beside 
myself, both of whom had been his lover. They had been far closer to Bruno 
than anyone else present, except his parents. Yet their grief had to be 
contained within the confines of manly acceptability. The irony of the 
difference between the suffocating life of the suburbs where we found 
ourselves, and our knowledge of the world in which Bruno had actually lived, 
as a magnificently affirmative and life-enhancing gay man, was all but 
unbearable.
32
 
 
It is also important to locate the significance of these funeral wishes within the 
broader political climate; a time when prejudices and fears about AIDS cohered with 
the prohibition against ‘the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family 
relationship’ in the notorious Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988. The 
memories of the lawyers here consequently speak both to Watney’s insistence, in 
1987, of speaking of ‘political funerals’,33 and, similarly, to Crimp’s seminal article in 
1989, which made a compelling case for troubling the binary of ‘mourning’ and 
                                                          
31
 L. Green et al., ‘Gagged grief and beleaguered bereavements? An analysis of multidisciplinary 
theory and research relating to same sex partnership bereavement’ (2008) 11 Sexualities 275. 
32
 S. Watney, Policing Desire (1987) 7. 
33
 S. Watney, Practices of Freedom (1994) 250. 
 9 
‘militancy’.34 As Halperin notes, ‘grief and anger weren’t individualizing or 
privatizing, however individual or private they might also be’.35 
In turning to the form that funeral wishes might dictate, a number of lawyers 
spoke of the importance of parties; and this applied equally to older and younger 
clients and to gays and lesbians (the word ‘gay’ in the quotes below referring to both). 
The lawyers also indicated that they sometimes play an active role in this: 
 
Leaving a decent sum of money for a party for their friends is not uncommon 
amongst gay clients.  It may conform to a stereotype there but certainly that is 
not unheard of and I’m often called upon to decide what is a reasonable 
amount to leave their Executors for the party for the friends and [laughter] 
obviously it depends on whether I’m going or not (8). 
 
Parties oh yes and I do tell my clients that the wake is tax deductible so  . . . 
why not have a great party and, again, probably, gay people rather than 
straight people who may be concerned about saving their money for their wife 
or their kids etc (5). 
 
Sometimes the lawyers suggested that the funeral and the party were in effect hard to 
distinguish: 
 
I did have incidents which were sort of blackly comic in a way . . . people, 
often with a highly developed sense of camp who wanted it, wanted that to 
follow through to the funeral itself. I well remember people talking to me 
about how they wanted the Humming chorus from Madame Butterfly as the 
coffin came in [laughter] but then the next day they’d want to change it to the 
Triumphal March from Aida (7). 
 
In taking parties as seriously as property in thinking about the constructing of an 
‘inheritance family’, Finch’s concept of ‘family display’ is pertinent.36 Funeral parties 
from this perspective can be understood as important moments for experiencing, 
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observing and narrating ‘who matters’, ‘who is my family’. But providing for a party 
is different from explicitly naming people in a will, for bequests communicate 
significance regardless of whether the bequest is accepted or more widely known. In 
contrast, the communication of kinship through a party requires people to attend, and 
this reinforces Finch’s point that creating kinship is often dependent on the actions of 
others, that some form of display, observation and recognition is required.
37
  
 
Instructions about the dispersal of ashes were also referred to: 
 
Most of them had very strong views about what should happen to the ashes 
and some of them made requests like . . . ‘I want my ashes to be scattered . . . 
in the South China Sea’. One wanted them scattered off the top of a particular 
mountain, and not just where the ashes should go but who should be given the 
job of taking the ashes. They were absolutely specific (4). 
 
Talking of gay clients, it may be that they want to be cremated and their ashes 
scattered in Mykonos or Ibiza or Fire Island. I had one client gosh he wanted 
some in Amsterdam and some in Fire Island, all over places where he’d had 
good times (5). 
 
Albeit with caution, it is tempting to read in these detailed desires a conscious or 
unconscious sense that for some a coffin was too akin to ‘the closet’38 - somewhere 
never to be returned to. Richards et al suggest that these dispersals reflect the mobile 
lifestyle among gay men as well as the drive for freedom and control of their own 
lives that is characteristic of gay liberation.
39
 Using a will as a means of expression 
was also evident in one lawyer’s reminiscence of clients’ disappointment about the 
absence of a requirement for a formal reading of the will. 
 
People also had old fashioned ideas from movies about will reading 
ceremonies that would happen after they died; they were quite disappointed 
when I said that, you know, there is no such thing  . . . they thought, you 
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know, it followed on from the funeral . . . they wanted it to have a dramatic 
effect (7). 
 
In planning parties, choreographing rites, multiple sites of dispersal of remains, 
troubling the boundaries between public and private, and political and personal, there 
is a performance of ‘promiscuity’, which as Sen reminds us is a ‘moving forward 
through indiscriminate mixing – a tendency that had to wait for the Victorians to 
become a sin’.40 That the promiscuous is rarely condoned mirrors in some ways the 
ambivalent perceptions of the instructions as, ‘over the top’, ‘disproportionately 
important’, and ‘camp’. Moreover, underlying these observations lurks a potential 
unease, for the investment in ‘a dramatic effect’, constructing a ‘melodrama’,41 
defiantly disrupts Watney’s memory of the experience of grief and mourning being 
restricted by the strict ‘confines of manly acceptability’.  
It is important to emphasise that the findings here are in no sense quantitative. 
Most notably none of the lawyers provided explicit examples of lesbians in this 
context. This may reflect the limited reach of this research, but their presence and role 
in the early days of AIDS have frequently been overlooked.
42
 It may be that lesbian 
rituals of mourning are organized collectively and informally beyond the text of a 
testator’s will. And the silence here may reflect the extent to which the significance 
for gay men is a response to dominant understandings of masculine modes of 
mourning, which may be less applicable to women generally. More research is needed 
here. Moreover, that the very particular instructions were far more likely to be from 
gay male clients does not suggest that they were typical of the gay clients. 
Nevertheless the narratives spoken of here speak to the complex interaction of a gay 
sensibility, style and subjectivity, an issue too often ignored in sociological literature, 
and avowedly so by equal rights campaigns.
43
  
In turning to look at types of beneficiaries, the possibility of ‘dramatic effect’ 
is more complex but no less significant. 
 
‘PARTNERS’ 
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On the surface a far more conventional story appears in the context of partners. In 
terms of both the contents of and the motives for writing a will, the lawyers’ 
reflections cohere with other research,
44
 and the approach adopted by the Law 
Commission,
45
 in emphasising the centrality of the surviving ‘spouse’. As one lawyer 
commenting on current practice noted: 
 
I think the majority are in a relationship for sure, because a lot of single people 
who I talk to and try to advocate will writing say that they don’t need a will . . 
. the same applies to gays and lesbians (6). 
 
While the overarching message from the findings here is one of convergence between 
gay, lesbian and heterosexual wills, at the same time the lawyers suggested variations, 
and highlighted distinct motivations, that reflected the shifting legal landscape of 
same sex relationship recognition and broader understandings of ‘inheritance 
families’. 
 
The following observations of the period before relationship recognition were typical: 
 
The overwhelming motivation, bearing in mind it was before the Civil 
Partnership Act, was to give a partner inheritance rights . . . the main 
motivation would always be for the partner or the long term friend to be 
recognised (7). 
 
Well with THT clients, it was basically that the surviving lover should have 
the client’s assets (4). 
 
In clear contrast to research about heterosexuals,
46
 the lawyers emphasised awareness 
amongst their gay and lesbian clients that their partners would not be recognised in 
the intestacy rules. This was the case for wills written in the past and now. One 
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consequence of this was a tendency for gay and lesbian clients to be younger than 
heterosexual clients.  
 
I would say the gay and lesbian clients are possibly on the younger side and I 
think that’s partly down to an awareness of the automatic provision not being 
there because the straight clients would, if they’ve married . . . know there’s 
some sort of provision and, if not, then they might be under the mistaken 
belief there is (2). 
 
Similarly, another observed that: 
 
What I would say is the people who are in same sex relationships are more 
aware of why they might need to make a will, whether they’ve formed a 
partnership or not, it seems to be in their consciousness that there isn’t 
automatic provision for a partner . . . whereas opposite sex couples might 
believe that there’s something called a common law wife so that still has a 
shadow (3). 
 
The ‘consciousness’ of the law is not surprising for older gays and lesbians. Indeed a 
heightened legal and political awareness was one of the unintended consequences of 
Section 28.
47
 Similarly one of the lawyers who was a member of the THT observed 
the wider impact of AIDS, on lesbians as much as gay men, in the development of 
this ‘consciousness’: 
 
Because of the work that we were doing in encouraging infected people to 
make their wills earlier, that information then trickled out to other gay people 
who were not infected and so word permeated through. If you think of the Gay 
Times and the Pink Paper, they were read by all sorts of people, infected or 
not and so, yes, gay people in their 20’s were reading these publications and 
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thinking, ‘I’m in a relationship with somebody else in good health . . . maybe 
we should write a will’ (4).48 
 
For younger gays and lesbians the awareness of the significance of legal recognition 
may be more attributable to the debates in Parliament about the CPA (and more 
recently same sex marriage). The plight of surviving partners played a critical role in 
demands for legal recognition, arguably to the extent that it strategically played down 
the protection provided by wills.
49
  
It is of course possible that the lawyers’ views about gay and lesbian 
‘consciousness’ of the law simply reflected the fact that they were primarily talking 
about people who contacted them in order to write a will. There is no way of knowing 
how many do not write wills, through oversight or otherwise. But in countering this, 
many also spoke of their experiences of acting for surviving partners in conflicts with 
families when the deceased had not written a will.  Probate lawyers see both sides. 
A key question is the impact of the CPA on will writing. None of the lawyers 
indicated any differences about partners being included on the basis of whether they 
were in a civil partnership
50
 or cohabiting - a significant finding bearing in mind the 
centrality of cohabitation rights in recent debates.
51
 One reported change was an 
increasing ability for gays and lesbians to be open about their relationships with 
lawyers.  
 
I’ve had couples who in the past have bought property together and . . . rather 
than as joint tenants, they would have been advised to own as tenants in 
common because the solicitor didn’t see them as a couple . . . ‘why would you 
want him to inherit your half of the house, surely you want it to go to your 
family?’ . . . That attitude has pretty much changed as I understand it’ (9). 
 
One lawyer suggested that the possibility of legal recognition might have led to fewer 
people writing wills: 
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In some respects it [the CPA] has had a change, there are I suppose fewer 
couples because they don’t immediately think ‘I need a will’ . . . it’s partly to 
do with people not appreciating the intestacy laws (9). 
 
No other lawyers made this point. But many remarked that while gays and lesbians 
were aware that their partners were not previously protected, this did not mean that 
they had any detailed knowledge of the intestacy rules; more widely there is evidence 
to suggest that many gays and lesbians entering civil partnerships have little 
awareness of the legal implications.
52
 Moreover, they all noted that none of their 
clients knew about the revocation rule, whereby entering into a civil partnership (or 
marriage) has the effect of revoking a prior will. This rule will impact on those who 
used a will to express funeral wishes and included people other than their partners in 
their will.
53
 The findings suggest that this is more likely to affect gays and lesbians, 
for while partners have a central place in most wills, this was complicated in a 
number of ways. 
In contrast to the majority, one lawyer, who wrote wills up until the early 
1990s, observed that the wills were: ‘Not primarily about partners, wills reflected a 
network of friendship . . . you got a sense of their life’ (10).  
The place of friends is explored in more detail below but it is significant that 
while those in relationships were seen by most of the lawyers to be in a majority – the 
above comment being atypical - some suggested that single gays and lesbians were in 
the past and now more likely to make wills:  
 
60/40 couples/singles .  .  . usually it is that they are creating a family . . . but a 
substantial number of single people amongst gays  . . . it goes again to the . . . 
a lot of gay people don’t get on with their families (9).  
 
Single people writing wills . . . Definitely, because they’re aware of the 
implications of not having one and they’re not in a civil partnership and they 
don’t want to rely on the intestacy rules (8). 
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Lawyers who suggested that partners are the key beneficiaries complicated this 
picture when talking about the proportion of the estate: ‘I suppose about 60 per cent 
of those couples would leave everything to each other’ (8); and ‘So the majority, 
maybe around 60 per cent are leaving everything to the partner’ (5). 
This fact itself does not conflict with the general patterns about the centrality 
of partners. But one reason for this cited by the lawyers was that their gay and lesbian 
clients in relationships were more likely to be financially independent. A consequence 
of this would be that dependency and the financial contributions of a partner, critical 
factors identified by Douglas et al,
54
 might be a less relevant consideration. The 
lawyers with the largest proportion of gay and lesbian clients both noted this:  
 
For the most part we have clients who are . . . economically independent. It is 
very much the minority where one has one partner who is incredibly well to 
do and the other partner isn’t and is kept.  It does happen, much more so with 
straight couples (5). 
 
I think that they tend to be as a general rule, quite financially independent . . . 
it’s quite rare in my experience for there to be one person who has nothing and 
the other person to have everything. The majority of these couples have not 
[pause] one of them hasn’t had to sacrifice a career to raise children. They’ve 
both worked as a rule . . . they have their own money as a general rule (8). 
 
You’d be surprised how many couples . . . the property is owned in one name. 
Certainly for straight couples . . . less so for gays . . . possibly because they’re 
two separate people with jobs. As a gay person generally, you have to support 
yourself (9). 
 
In these comments ‘gay’ referred to lesbians too – but the impact of children, 
discussed below, is critical here. The statements bear out other research findings, 
which suggest that economic inter-dependency is far more common in heterosexual 
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couples.
55
  As Smart comments, ‘the issue of equality (or inequality) for same-sex 
couples is established in relation to other matters and not in relation to money’.56 With 
younger gays and lesbians both more likely to have children it remains to be seen if 
this pattern will alter. 
The lawyers further complicated the privileged position of partners in wills by 
highlighting the enduring nature of gay and lesbian relationships with ex-partners. 
 
It is very strange . . . Straight wills seem to exclude the ex-partner absolutely . 
. . you know, ‘I do not want that bastard to inherit anything of mine’ . . . 
whereas a lot of gay wills [pause] ex partners remain friends so they may sort 
of actually leave a memento to them or say ‘I want to leave them a house’ 
because they were their ex-partner . . . there doesn’t seem to be that same 
sense of aggression necessarily (9). 
 
Of course, the lovers obviously came into the category of friend (4).   
 
[ex-lovers] might still be good friends and they do feature. I had one particular 
client he seems to have had a stream of people who have come through his life 
as lovers and they all seem to feature. He feels obliged to look after them all 
(5). 
 
The presence of ex-lovers in the wills attests to the importance of being attentive to 
how terminology is not simply descriptive but productive of knowledge, in this 
context reinforcing assumptions and ideals about the exclusivity of the conjugal 
couple. One lawyer noted this implicitly in explaining the role of sympathetic 
lawyers:  
 
One reason why someone might want to go to a gay solicitor is simply 
because they kind of know more about it and they know more about how the 
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thing works compared to heterosexual relationships where it tends to be that 
you break up and you never speak again unless you’ve got kids (8).57 
 
One final and unexpected finding about partners, which spoke to an earlier period, 
concerned marriages of convenience, often between a gay man and a lesbian. Prior to 
the CPA these had a particular significance for same sex trans-national relationships. 
It is not possible to know the extent to which these marriages were entered into to 
enable a person to live with a British lover who would now have the option of 
formalising the relationship; these marriages have never been researched.
58
 But, either 
way, these marriages, which utilised (and transgressed) an institution from which their 
own relationships were excluded, are a fond part of anecdotal community history.
59
 In 
the context of inheritance they resulted in the need to effectively ‘uncouple’ in a will. 
Awareness of these marriages was one of the reasons why sympathetic lawyers in the 
past would never assume that an openly gay or lesbian client was not married. As one 
of the lawyers recounted: 
 
In the 90s when it was common for arranged marriages, marriages of 
convenience, they would have the phrase ‘I’m leaving nothing to blah de blah 
for reasons known to both of us’ . . . so that would explain why they had 
excluded their wife or husband, if it came to being challenged (9). 
 
In the past gays and especially lesbians were also more likely to have been in more 
conventional opposite sex marriages – which raised particular implications in the 
context of children. 
 
‘CHILDREN’ 
 
Children occupy a central place in the practices and legal regulation of inheritance. As 
Gilding notes, it is convention rather then reflexivity that dominates this aspect of 
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family life.
60
 Even in England and Wales where, in contrast to civil law systems,
61
 
testamentary freedom enables parents to disinherit their (non-dependent) children,
62
 
such an action is culturally exceptional, deemed ‘unnatural’,63 and can give rise to 
judicial and popular speculation and suspicion.  
The findings here suggest that gay and lesbian will writing is fundamentally 
no different in this respect and coheres with Douglas et al’s finding that children 
‘represent the project of the self to which people attach most significance during their 
lives’.64 As one lawyer noted: 
 
The children are very rarely excluded or not fairly provided for, I would say . . 
.  I don’t believe that there’s any less desire to provide for their children than 
with the heterosexual people (8). 
 
This was confirmed by lawyers who suggested that the less conventional aspects of 
gay and lesbian wills in part simply reflected the fact that they were still less likely to 
have children:  
 
I suppose . . . the difference between the gay wills and the straight will is that 
straight wills often have children . . . parents are obliged to leave their estate to 
their kids . . . but there’s more flexibility for a gay person (5). 
 
The same lawyer went on to suggest that this might be changing: 
 
As time’s going on and perhaps with more gay people having their own 
families, having children, then perhaps friends feature less in their wills 
because they will have their own children whom they feel primarily 
responsible for (5). 
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Here the reference to ‘gay’ is revealing, for in the context of children the position of 
lesbians is very different. Lesbians both in the past and now are much more likely to 
have children. In the recent past custody disputes between lesbians and their former 
husbands were a critical site of legal conflict and political activism.
65
 In this period 
wills were also important, not simply to benefit the children, but for appointing 
guardians - a point emphasised by popular guides to the law from the 1980s.
66
 While 
relevant for all parents, it was particularly important for lesbians at a time when 
lesbian co-parents had no possibility of being legally recognised as parents. Hasson 
has noted that the appointment of guardians is overlooked in inheritance studies, yet 
they provide a significant insight into people’s personal community and 
relationships.
67
 How guardianship has been and is now used by lesbians warrants 
further research. 
While the fundamental desire to privilege children was a key finding here, one 
lawyer noted that instructions for wills  - for both lesbians and increasingly for gay 
men too - often brought to the fore questions of parenthood. 
 
It all depends on how the family has been created . . . whether or not having 
children was a joint decision between the two of them . . . but if it’s a couple 
who’ve had children together . . . everything to the partner, very much like a 
married couple. Where  . . . one parent has come in with children, you’re 
going to have to consider  . . . biological father or mother or whatever, what 
rights they have in relation to it . . . you know I may send them to one of my 
colleagues who deals with family law (9). 
 
The practitioner demarcation of probate and family law is problematic for people 
seeking advice as many firms only provide one or the other.
68
 However one question 
not addressed by the lawyers, and which warrants further research, is whether gay and 
lesbian co-parents who are not biologically related to a child are more likely to 
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consider the child part of their inheritance family than, for example, a heterosexual 
step-parent. In Douglas et al’s research, and in recent debates about intestacy reform, 
the tension between the primacy of parent-child blood ties and the position of 
surviving ‘second’ spouses is a key issue.69 In the context of gay and lesbian 
inheritance families the more ambivalent significance of blood ties,
70
 together with 
the findings about ex-partners above, suggest that in this context adult-child 
relationships might be more likely to endure beyond the adult relationship than in 
heterosexual families.
71
  
Two unexpected issues relating to children were raised which depart from 
conventional narratives. Both were raised by a number of the lawyers and discussed 
in some detail. The first concerned gay men with children from earlier heterosexual 
relationships, and the second concerned ‘godchildren’. 
While conventionally an important motive for will writing, two lawyers 
indicated that it was only their raising of the issue with gay clients that sometimes 
revealed the existence of children. This was in stark contrast to lesbians with children 
– who would almost always be living with or be in contact with the children – and 
confirms the extent to which in gay and lesbian politics in the recent past children 
were almost exclusively associated with the latter.  
 
When writing wills for gay men who only mentioned a partner or friends it 
was always important not to assume they didn’t have children . . . you’d be 
surprised how many had children in previous marriages and now had no 
contact . . . it was important to ask because of any future challenges (10). 
 
What was more common was gay men in a gay relationship who would tell 
me, because I asked, that they had previously been married and had children 
(4). 
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As the reference to ‘future challenges’ indicates, in these situations the gay men did 
not consider these children to be part of their ‘inheritance family’ and the lawyers 
were tasked with ensuring that they were effectively excluded.  
 
Often children were dealt with by being ignored in the will, and then an 
explanation in the side document about why they were being ignored. For 
example ‘I haven’t seen the child for the last 10 years’ or ‘the child’s mother 
told me I should never have anything more to do with the child’ (4). 
 
These narratives from the past cohere with research that has revealed the extent to 
which older gay men as well as lesbians are parents.
72
 The clients here, predominantly 
men over forty in the 1980s and 1990s, are of the generation who were not only more 
likely to have married before coming out as gay, but would also have had almost no 
possibility of challenging an ex-wife determined to refuse ‘access’. The 1977 House 
of Lords case of Re D, which decisively cut a father out of a child’s life explicitly 
because of the father’s homosexuality, is testament to the prevailing social and legal 
context about gay men as fathers.
73
 Confirming that these scenarios are both less 
likely now and less distinctive is the experience of a younger lawyer who noted in a 
matter of fact way: 
 
It’s not a big issue but it must be 5 – 10 per cent of wills I make for gay men, 
where they have had families, may have been married . . . they have a partner 
who’s perhaps their primary concern but they have children in the background 
so it’s a bit like when I do wills for people who are on their second marriage 
(5). 
 
While unusual, there are many reasons why parents might disinherit their children. 
And it is far from unheard of for heterosexual men to disappear from a child’s life. 
But the findings here throw light on a very particular experience where the violence 
of law itself played a critical role in the construction of ‘inheritance families’.  
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The inclusion of ‘godchildren’ in the wills of gays and lesbians was significant 
as Douglas et al found that they figured hardly at all.
74
 Their findings were mirrored 
here in the experiences of a lawyer who had very few gay or lesbian clients. In 
response to the question: ‘What about godchildren? Children of friends?’, the 
response was: 
 
Virtually never.  I’m still in touch with my godmother but I don’t think she’s 
recognised me in her will.  No, the godparent relationship sadly is over (1).  
  
However the lawyers who had a large number of gay and lesbian clients all had a very 
different response. This applied to gays and lesbians and far from being something in 
the past was a practice that appeared to be increasing. The following three 
observations were typical and were expressed with great certainty: 
 
Yes, godchildren  . . . particularly with gay clients . . . I often wonder if 
married couples appoint gay friends to be godparents, knowing that they’re 
not going to have their own children and perhaps it’s a good idea from a 
monetary aspect and certainly I do feel that my gay clients perhaps think more 
of their godchildren than straight clients (5).  
 
Absolutely. A lot of gay people are godparents now . . . there is that much 
more so than previously, they will leave something to them . . . they have 
these relationships now and they can be acknowledged publicly I suppose (9). 
 
They too benefit, that’s definitely a feature with gays . . . It’s not uncommon I 
would say but it’s certainly . . . children of friends to benefit without question. 
Godchildren? Often the same, one and the same aren’t they? (8). 
 
While the expression ‘godchild’ was used, these relationships are not necessarily 
religious or formalised in any way. That there exists no alternative secular 
terminology that indicates a status for particular ‘children of friends’ reinforces the 
extent to which these relationships remain marginal. The inclusion of godchildren 
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also supports findings, explored below, which indicate that friends are more likely to 
be included in gay and lesbian wills, and also reinforces the idea that ‘blood ties’ may 
be of far less significance for gays and lesbians in creating ‘familial’ forms of vertical 
transmission. Sedgwick’s celebration of ‘avuncular’ relationships – which for her 
refers to aunts as much as uncles - is pertinent here for she applauds that their: 
 
Intimate access to children needn’t depend on their own pairing or 
procreation. It’s very common, of course, for some of them to have the office 
of representing nonconforming or non-productive sexualities to children.
75
 
 
A comparison with nieces and nephews, however, is revealing as one lawyer both 
supports but also complicates interpreting these relationships as uncomplicated 
representations of ‘families of choice’: 
 
If somebody is going to leave a bequest or make provision for nieces or 
nephews and they have godchildren, quite often if they are giving pecuniary 
legacies, then it is the same, there’s no distinction. If it’s a division of residue 
estate it’s often the case that it would be the family that would take a bigger 
share (9). 
 
The popularity of gay men, in particular, as godparents is, it would seem, more than a 
contemporary anecdotal journalistic myth.
76
 And the fact that the practice overall 
appears to be increasing was reinforced by the fact that references to godchildren 
were far less pronounced in the accounts of the two lawyers who predominantly wrote 
wills during late 80s and early 90s. Lawyer 5’s reference to the monetary aspects 
above might also explain why it seems more frequently, although far from 
universally, to be men than women who are chosen, for gay men are more likely to be 
richer and less likely to have children of their own than lesbians.  
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‘FRIENDS’ 
 
Friends occupy a central place in the literature about ‘families of choice’ – and have 
long been perceived as of particular significance for gays and lesbians.
77
 But reading 
‘friendship’ as a relationship potentially at odds with and representing an alternative 
to ‘the family’ is not new.78 E.M. Forster, in his 1906 novel The Longest Journey, 
spoke of both their marginalisation and a desire for recognition that mirrors current 
concerns:  
 
So strong it is, and so fragile . . . Nature has no use for us: she has cut her stuff 
differently. Dutiful sons, loving husbands, responsible fathers – these are what 
she wants, and if we are friends it must be in our spare time . . . he wished 
there was a society, a kind of friendship office, where the marriage of true 
minds could be registered.
79
 
 
Calls to take friendship seriously often shift, arguably too quickly, into a demand for 
legal recognition. In a succinct review of the literature, Westwood, who is 
sympathetic to claims for inheritance rights claims for friends, acknowledges that the 
proposed solutions are all ‘problematic in different ways’ in both principle and 
practice.
80
 
In the recent socio-legal research about inheritance none of the scenarios or 
vignettes used included any mention of friends;
81
 their significance has also been 
marginalised in overlooking the appointment of Executors and Guardians – a 
particularly important issue for lesbians as noted above. However, Douglas et al did 
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address the issue and concluded that ‘friends are not prioritized over family but may 
be included in the absence of a created family’.82 
The findings here would appear to challenge this ‘default’ model. The 
following are examples of typical statements and the references to ‘gay’ below 
included lesbians: 
 
I would say that gay and lesbian clients are more inclined to pass things on to 
friends and that seems to be one motivation for them making their wills (2). 
 
A lot of the straight people who come in it’s all families and very rarely do 
friends, or charities for that matter, come in and one of the things that I’ve 
noticed with gays is that friends do pop up a lot more (3). 
 
Gay people will leave shares of their residue to friends more than straight 
couples. The survivor of straight couples might be more inclined to think of 
charities and family . . . with gay people, a lot of them consider their good 
friends as their family, friends certainly feature more I would say in the wills I 
do for gay people (5). 
 
With straight wills, the lion’s share would go to family  . . . With gay wills, 
there would be more emphasis on things going to lovers and friends (4). 
 
Lots of the wills of gay men weren’t primarily about partners, they reflected a 
network of friendships . . . you got a sense of their life (10). 
 
While on first reading presenting a challenge to the findings of Douglas et al, and 
notwithstanding the inherent difficulties in comparing findings from different 
methods, the striking point is the extent to which the findings arguably cohere. The 
most obvious reason for this is that the wills spoken of above might simply be 
examples of the small percentage of people who do include friends. Moreover, 
Douglas et al found that friends were more likely to be found in the wills of younger 
people and those without children, both categories that disproportionately, according 
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to the lawyers here, include gays and, albeit to a lesser extent, lesbians. Furthermore, 
a closer reading of the data complicates interpreting the statements above as cohering 
with a celebratory ‘families of choice’ model. This is because the lawyers here 
confirmed Douglas et al’s finding that people who included friends were ‘more apt to 
suggest leaving personal belongings to them’.83 Again in this context references to 
‘gays’ included lesbians. 
 
Yes, gay people often have big groups of friends and they want to leave a little 
bit of money to lots of people or a share to lots of people so you might have 
somebody getting 1 per cent of their estate, somebody else getting 10 per cent 
and there are these complicated long arrangements (8). 
  
Friends, certainly in my experience, pretty rarely have the residual legacy, 
they normally get sort of £2000 or £5000 whatever (1). 
 
They [friends] would be spoken of in terms of who was going to be getting 
bequests (4). 
 
Quite often it’s pecuniary legacies or asking people to be able to select a 
memento from their personal chattels . . . or they get a small sum of money, 
just a little thank you, ‘thank you for being my friend’, ‘have a little holiday’ 
(9). 
 
One lawyer, however, disagreed, and highlighted the importance of looking at 
survivorship clauses: 
 
On gays’ wills, on the second death, if we’re talking about people in 
partnerships, then friends will feature largely in residue. On single gay people, 
yes friends feature in residue too (5). 
 
Specific gifts, legacies and parties are all ways of personalising a will, enabling it to 
be read and experienced as an expressive form of life writing as much as a functional 
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text for the transfer of legal title. The significance of possessions as a form of 
‘identity property’84 and the distinction between material and symbolic values are 
critical here.
85
 Executors have a critical role to play here and, echoing Westwood’s 
findings, it may be that the recipient of a specific gift is far closer emotionally to a 
testator than the beneficiary of the residue of an estate.
86
 The making of a specific gift 
– pecuniary or otherwise - enables testators to distinguish between those they might 
feel obliged to mention and those they wish to mention. The catch-all expression 
‘beneficiaries’ obscures these distinctions. But Roman and continental legal systems 
make a clear distinction between ‘heirs’ and ‘legatees’.87 Of course, unlike in these 
systems, testators in England have a choice about who falls into which category, but 
this distinction resonates on an emotional level. 
The position of friends was further complicated by the finding, noted above, 
that the category ‘friends’ can include ex-partners. It is possible to romanticise the 
ease and value of these enduring relationships. How friendships, of all types, are kept 
going despite ‘irritations, disappointments, boredom and even some antagonism’88 has 
recently been explored by Smart et al. In supporting the argument that ‘idealised 
friendships are not the answer to the problematic realities of other relational forms’,89 
they note that: 
 
Friendship tends to be valorized as a supportive, mutually beneficial 
relationship and the force of this depiction has often been developed in the 
context of arguments about how friendships are chosen rather than imposed 
and how they reflect shared interests and intimacy. Hence the idea that there 
may well be unrewarding or poor friendships has not been much explored 
even though it is well understood in the parallel field of family studies that 
close relationships can sometimes be experienced as enduringly problematic.
90
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This came to the fore in an unexpected way in the lawyers’ references to pets.  
 
As one lawyer observed: 
 
No, pets were very important to these people and one of my clients explained 
why, it was that while the client was ill in bed, the cat was always there, the 
friends would come and go but the cat was always there (4). 
 
Others commented - ‘Oh lesbian cat clauses, I’ve had to put in plenty of them’ (10), 
and ‘It used to be more common with lesbians but increasingly common with gay 
men now’ (9). Arguing, wisely, against sweeping interpretations, Tipper notes that 
‘pets may be seen as family, belongings, children, things, individuals, companions 
and commodities’.91 Curiously, she omits the word ‘friend’. But the place of pets in 
wills – and the possible gendered dynamics - adds a new dimension to the emerging 
literature on the animal-human boundary, and it is a subject that warrants further 
research. 
 
‘FAMILIES’ 
 
Throughout the findings an underlying thread is that the wills of gays and lesbians 
have been utilised to construct ‘inheritance families’ that are in some ways 
unconventional. Read through an ‘individualisation’ thesis92, with the emphasis on an 
ideal of pure or reflexive relationships, these wills represent a departure from the 
conventional ties of ‘family’.  
In the explicit references to families the findings to a certain extent bear this 
out. But at the same time they demonstrate that testators’ ‘choice’ of inheritance 
family is contingent on the behaviour of their families as much as their own. 
 
Some of them did not want their parents in the will at all because they couldn’t 
stand their parents, or the parents had issues over the fact that these people 
were gay, so parents weren’t going to get anything (4). 
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With gay wills there would be more emphasis on things going to lover and 
friends, especially in those cases where family were excluded because of 
attitudes to sexuality (4). 
 
Particularly within the lesbian and gay set up, sadly people have been 
ostracised and their families don’t support the relationship, in which case, it 
will all go to, what might be called, the more sympathetic family, I’ve 
certainly come across that (1). 
 
As the emphasis added above indicates, what is striking about these findings – and 
which applied equally to lesbians and were typical of responses from all the lawyers – 
is the extent to which the exclusion of biological family members was frequently 
perceived to be in response to having been rejected by their family because of their 
sexuality. One lawyer indicated that this rejection was sometimes communicated 
through a parental will:  
  
I know that many of them were excluded from their family’s will, that’s 
certainly come up in the past (8). 
 
But one lawyer noted that while familial attitudes might be a consideration, unfettered 
testamentary freedom could be trumped by a sense of obligation in the context of 
‘family money’, expressing the significance of ‘blood tie and lineage’93: 
 
I think that the feeling of it being family money and having received it 
anyway, in spite of their sexuality, means that that overrides the prejudice and 
they think ‘oh I really should do it’ . . . that would be the general feeling (8). 
 
A critical question is whether this applied across the time-line or whether it is a 
practice primarily from the past. One lawyer observed that: 
 
Usually it’s because of their disapproval of their lifestyle, well sexuality. 
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. . . It’s always been a feature but I don’t remember it being particularly 
common or uncommon at any one time, I don’t think it’s changed very much 
actually (8). 
 
However the majority, referring to both gay men and lesbians, identified a significant 
shift: 
 
In the 90s a lot of wills excluded the family. It was interesting they didn’t 
seem to have the same relationship with their family, which people do now, 
because now they will make provision for family, leave things for parents or 
siblings. Gay people seem to have much better relationships with their 
families these days . . . you see it in their wills, the attitude has changed . . . I 
think people ran away to the City and didn’t have anything to do with their 
families, there are still people who don’t and want to exclude family 
completely, but the vast majority will mention at least one sibling (9). 
 
A lot of older gay people I’ve made wills for don’t refer to family, it’s more 
likely to be younger people that still have relationships with their family. If 
they want to get in the will, for siblings and nieces and nephews, they should 
be nice to the gay people (5). 
 
These observations of a generational shift mirror research about older gays and 
lesbians, which has found that they are more likely to be estranged from their 
families.
94
 There is a poetic but compelling parallel here between the wills of older 
gays and lesbians and those of soldiers in ancient Rome. Mobile, and debarred in law 
from marriage, Champlin notes how the ‘lack of family did not inhibit testation for 
them’ but that: 
 
the majority of soldiers chose as heirs their comrades. Here more than 
anywhere one senses the lack of interest in family who are not descendants, 
the absence of feeling that patrimony must be handed over, augmented but 
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otherwise intact, to the next familial heir: the childless entrusted their money 
to their friends.
95
  
 
Confirming the generational shift, Heaphy et al’s research about younger gays and 
lesbians found: ‘coming out tended not to fundamentally disrupt “given” relationships 
with kin’; an increased ‘personal importance of maintaining connections with families 
of origin’; and that they ‘appeared to be more actively invested in convention than in 
radical relational experimentation’.96  
A further indication of a generational shift can also be detected in the findings 
here about charities:  
 
In the 80’s and 90’s Crusade and Terence Higgins Trust featured largely and 
sometimes these gay charities continue to receive benefit but less so than they 
did 10 years ago, much less so than 20 years ago (5). 
 
Certainly in the 90s . . . most gay people would leave things to virtually all gay 
charities and now there is a broader range . . . in the 90s everything was much 
more focused on being gay . . . whereas now it’s about different life 
experiences . . . the main gay charities seem to get mentioned occasionally but 
not so much as they used to (9). 
 
Only gay men were referred to in this context. It is possible that women’s rights 
charities featured in lesbian wills from the past – but generational shifts may be 
similar.  And again the narratives here echo Heaphy et al’s finding that for younger 
people ‘ideals and practices were embedded in and supported by personal 
communities rather than critical sexual communities’, a shift that reflects a broader 
move from identity to intimacy.
97
 
How to respond to and interpret the ‘post equality world’98 is a complex 
question. For some commentators these shifts resonate with a broader critique of 
contemporary mainstream gay and lesbian politics. For them, the focus on formal 
legal equality – and relationship rights in particular – has silenced earlier radical and 
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feminist perspectives and with it the possibility of alliances with broader social, racial 
and economic justice claims.
99
 Yet, while mindful of this, Heaphy et al have 
introduced the concept of ‘ordinariness’ as an alternative to ‘assimilation’ as a 
framework for conceptualising the impact of the social and legal changes.
100
 And 
Moran warns against the pitfalls of theories that, in a desire for clarity, interpret life 
through ‘simplistic violent hierarchies of politics as either progressive or 
reactionary’.101 Generationality – how changing social experiences mark off groups 
from each other - is often overlooked within these debates, but as Plummer argues it 
provides an additional framework for complicating ‘clashes between systems of 
aspiration’.102  
The significance of generational standpoints is clear from the findings about 
families. But across the generations what is constant is that families matter. Central to 
this reading is Smart’s concept of ‘connectedness’. She emphasises that 
‘connectedness’ is ‘not a “human good”’ or ‘invariably nourishing and inevitably 
desirable’.103 Thus it is as evident in the conscious dekinning in the wills of older gays 
and lesbians as it is in the inclusion of families in the wills of the younger clients. 
Connectedness as a concept is helpful here as it complicates the construction of a 
crude binary between ‘individualisation’ and ‘family’.104 Consequently the findings 
cohere with Douglas et al’s identification of the importance of ‘inheritance families’ 
being, ‘grounded in love’,105 for this is an implicit acknowledgment of the 
significance of its opposite: hate. From this perspective a will from which a birth 
family is excluded represents not simply a celebration of an alternative ‘family of 
choice’ but an affective text that communicates the extent to which personal choices 
are scripted collectively rather than independently; in other words, while testamentary 
freedom enables the exercise of agency, ‘agency does not imply freedom from 
power’.106  
 
                                                          
99
 R. Ferguson, ‘The historiographical operation of gay rights’ in Leckey, id.; R. Auchmuty, 
‘Dissolution or disillusion: the unraveling of civil partnerships’ in Barker and Monk op. cit., n. 
52. 
100
 Heaphy et al, op. cit. n. 20. 
101
 L. Moran, ‘What kind of field is “law, gender & sexuality”? Present concerns and possible futures’ 
(2009) 17(3) Feminist Legal Studies 309, at 312. 
102
 Plummer, op. cit., n. 20, p. 182. 
103
 Smart, op. cit, n. 24. 
104
 Id, p. 189. 
105
 Douglas et al, op. cit., n. 11, p. 271. 
106
 Heaphy et al, op. cit., n. 20, p. 8 (emphasis in the original). 
 34 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The small scale of this research requires caution in reaching conclusions. But the 
findings here have a number of uses.  
One of the established benefits of empirical research with lawyers is its ability 
to provide insight into how legal practice operates ‘in the shadow of the law’107 - a 
line of enquiry that highlights that in providing advice lawyers also mould and act as 
gatekeepers to law. The research here demonstrates a further use by revealing that 
lawyers’ memories and interactions with clients provide a rich source that can 
contribute to sociological debates about families and personal life. While not without 
its limitations it is a method that could be used to examine a wide range of other 
issues beyond law.  
A key use here was the ability to present a reflective picture of will making 
across generations, from the late 1970s to the present day. This timeline is particularly 
valuable in the context of gays and lesbians as it encompassed divergent moments of 
relative ‘liberation’ as well as key social and legal moments, such as the AIDS crisis 
and the introduction of equal rights. In this way the findings provide an alternative 
archive that complements other historical and sociological sources. Here the findings 
about the gay men who ‘lost’ contact with their children and the complex funeral 
wishes, especially during the early days of AIDS, are important as both have been 
under-researched. But the dominance of men in these accounts highlights a more 
general limitation and the need for further research that focuses on lesbians.  
For both gays and lesbians a key finding that spoke to the significance of 
generations was the increasing tendency for the younger clients to include members 
of their birth families in their wills. This is a shift that undoubtedly reflects the impact 
of familial homophobia on earlier generations and demonstrates that, as Weeks notes, 
‘attitudes have surely changed in fundamental ways’.108 But caution is required here, 
as it is important to emphasise that this shift is not experienced by all, and that the 
findings here, like much research, obscures the experiences from all generations of 
less privileged and confidently open gays and lesbians. The relationship between 
personal and political consciousness in kinship formation is complex, and the findings 
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here highlight how inheritance can be a revealing site for complicating accounts that 
to date focus almost exclusively on the couple relationship and children. 
In the context of finding ‘differences’ between gays and lesbians and 
heterosexuals, a key finding was convergence in respect of the centrality of partners 
and children in wills. In this respect there was also a high degree of continuity across 
generations and one that applied equally to gays and lesbians. With more acceptance 
by birth families and with both gays and lesbians more likely to have children of their 
own, in the future the convergence may increase. But the findings here indicate that 
the centrality of partners does not necessarily mean the relationships are experienced 
in the same ways in terms of dependency and exclusivity. And the findings about 
friends, and linked to this the recognition of children of friends (‘godchildren’), both 
evident in contemporary wills, indicate distinctive ways in which both gays and 
lesbians have used and continue to use wills to recognise kinships that remain 
marginalised in conventional understandings of ‘inheritance families’. It is important 
to emphasise that these differences complicate rather than contradict the stories of 
convergence. Further research about personal belongings, and, particularly by 
lesbians, the appointment of guardians, are avenues that might further complicate the 
picture. And it is also important to acknowledge Westwood’s point that wills ‘do not 
always reflect the most significant relationships, care practices or kinship 
formations’.109 In other words ‘inheritance families’ are not the same as lived 
experiences of families. 
The cautious findings of difference suggest that the intestacy rules are likely to 
be more at odds with the ‘inheritance families’ of many of the lawyers’ gay and 
lesbian clients. The findings confirm the already acknowledged need to reconsider the 
position of cohabitees on intestacy - an issue arguably of equal concern to 
heterosexuals. But the need for further research about the position of children of 
same-sex co-parents is a distinctive issue. Whereas their position on parental divorce 
(dissolution or separation) has attracted considerable attention, questions about 
inheritance have been overlooked and may come to the fore in years ahead as the 
increasing number of gay and lesbian parents age and their children negotiate their 
deaths. But more widely, the degrees of convergence, the extent to which the findings 
confirm their distinctiveness, and most importantly the difficulty of factoring in ‘more 
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subjective features’110 all point towards highlighting the importance of will writing 
rather than a reform of the intestacy rules. That more could be done to target 
information and improve access to services was emphasised by one of the younger 
lawyers who, commenting on the Law Society’s annual Write a Will Week, noted that 
‘generally that’s for straight people’ (9). 
The principle of testamentary freedom, while not unlimited,
111
 privileges 
autonomy and the individual. In doing so it creates a space for the construction of 
inheritance families that can resist conventions. And for this reason they have and 
remain an important site for gays and lesbians – and others – to communicate 
alternative personal lived experiences that sometimes, but not always, cohere with 
radical aspirations. But wills are complex texts – exercises in life writing – and the 
findings draw attention to the necessity of troubling ideas of autonomy in the creating 
of families and kin by taking seriously the place of emotions, memories and 
connectedness, as much as structures and functions. Indeed it is this quality of wills 
that makes them such a compelling resource for testators as much as scholars. 
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